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I
INTRODUCTION

This article will investigate the strength of competition in health insurance
markets. The focus will be on traditional economic notions of structure and
performance indicators that fit the neoclassical paradigm of perfect
competition. The article will also consider the form of rivalry between health
insurers in less than perfectly competitive markets. The objective of the paper
is to describe ways of thinking about competition in any given health
insurance market and to summarize the views of those who have investigated
such matters.
The broad question the article addresses is the possible sources of market
power in health insurance markets. Without a source of market power, price
cannot be raised above the competitive level, and antitrust issues will not
arise. By cataloging the valuable services embodied in health insurance, this
article will show that the "pure" insurance function-the pooling of risk for
the benefit of risk-averse consumers-is unlikely to be a subject or a source of
market power. The other service that health insurers provide is then
investigated. This service might be defined as "cost containment,"
"expenditure control," or "limitation of moral hazard." In the broadest
sense, it consists of the specification of the conditions under which medical
services are purchased wholly or in part with insurance proceeds. The article
will then examine in more detail whether in fact the markets for "pure"
insurance and for cost containment have deviated from the competitive ideal.
In addition, it will be shown that the ability of any insurer (even a Blue Cross
or Blue Shield insurer) to obtain or retain market power in the risk-pooling
function is very limited. Obtaining market power requires government action,
such as especially favorable tax treatment, and is limited to whatever
advantage that action conveys. The most probable source of market power
for the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans is the monopsony power which
arises from their large buyer market share in the medical services market. This
article will demonstrate that the market power allegedly possessed by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans over the years must be associated with this
function. Finally, the role of advertising and good will in generating market
power will be examined.
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II
How

TO THINK ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE

This section establishes some important preliminaries. First, it will be
established that the identity of the health insurance customer involves some
surprising ambiguities. Next, appropriate models for the relationships
between customers, health insurers, sellers of medical services, and providers
of inputs to those services will be examined. The market will be shown to be
complicated by a variety of transactions and a variety of product
characteristics.
More than 90 percent of private health insurance in the United States is
group insurance provided in connection with employment, and it therefore
seems sensible to focus primarily on the extent of competition in that market.'
The most obvious way to think of the demand side of the employment group
insurance market is to imagine that the employer (or, in some circumstances,
the union) is the demander. Even in those firms where employees have no
choice among plans, an ambiguity immediately arises-what is the demander's
objective in choosing the firm from which health insurance is purchased? It is
clearly not just minimum premium cost to the employer, since that objective
could better be served by offering no fringe benefit at all. Because employerprovided coverage has tax advantages, 2 even when cash wages are reduced by
an equivalent amount, low-cost and low-benefit health insurance must
eventually be less attractive than more costly but more generous coverage.
Here, the assumption is that the employer chooses on behalf of the marginal
employee-selecting the single insurer that employees would prefer when
there is no choice, and selecting the options to be made available to
employees when choices are offered.
It would be simple to imagine that the employer, personified by the
benefits manager, would make the choice of type of policy, level of coverage,
and identity of seller with good (if not perfect) information, since gathering
such information and making such choices is the responsibility of the benefits
manager. The only problem with this assumption is that if employees
mistakenly prefer one insurer over another, the employer who wishes to
attract those employees had better mimic their mistaken choice. The choice
of an inconvenient or incompetent insurer will soon be noticed by employees,
but the selection of an insurer who simply makes miserable that small fraction
of employees unlucky enough to be seriously ill will not necessarily be
1.

See generally Arnett & Trapnell, PrivateHealth Insurance: New Measures of a Complex and Changing

Industry, 6 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 31 (1984).

2. The tax advantage arises because premium payments are a tax-deductible cost for the
employer, while benefit payments are not treated as taxable income for the employee. A group of
employees currently paying for their own health insurance could agree with their employer to have
their money income reduced by the amount of the premium, in return for which the employer would
"provide" health insurance. The result of this transaction, which gives exactly the same insurance
benefits to the employees, is that each employee would reduce his income taxes by the tax that would
have been paid on the income used to pay the insurance premium. See Phelps, Tax Policy, Health

Insurance, and Health Care, in

MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE

198 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).

Page 237: Spring 1988]

COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS

avoided, even by the most knowledgeable benefits manager. In any event, the
analysis that follows will usually treat the choice of insurer as if it were made
by a well-informed consumer, but with the occasional possibility that the
choice will depend on an employee's strongly held prejudices and erroneous
beliefs.
A small minority of people buy individual private insurance. In this case,
there are no important tax advantages, 3 and the administrative cost of
insurance sold on a person-by-person basis is substantially greater than for
group insurance. In both the individual and small group cases, insurers
typically engage in underwriting, examining carefully the characteristics of the
individual or group that affect the risk of losses, and charging higher
premiums or declining to sell coverage if the risk is thought to be high.
4
Underwriting is nonexistent for other group insurance.
The higher administrative costs for individual insurance arise from the
higher per-insured cost of selling and collecting premiums for individual or
small-group buyers and from the expenses of underwriting. Consumer
information is not as complete for individual insurance. With the exception of
special attention to consumer ignorance, the analysis of the market for
individual insurance largely parallels that for group insurance.
This describes the buyers of health insurance, but what are they buying?
They are buying two things. The first is the traditional risk-spreading
function of insurance. It will be argued that competition, despite possible
buyer ignorance, works reasonably well for this function. The second may be
broadly defined as the arrangement of some or all of the conditions of
purchase of health care services. The peculiar nature of medical care makes
provision of this service important for health insurance, more so than for
other forms of insurance, but also leads to some fundamental peculiarities in
this market not shared by other forms of insurance (or other types of
services).
The main peculiarity in medical care and medical insurance markets is, of
course, moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to incentive effects that insurance
coverage may have on the level of medical spending. 5 Current forms of
3. Private health insurance premiums can be itemized as a deduction for the individual federal
income tax, but only if uninsured medical expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income. See 26
U.S.C. § 213 (1983).
4. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE 5 (1988).
5. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968). More
precisely, insurance coverage has two kinds of effects on use. By increasing wealth in situations in
which high medical expenses are incurred (and reducing wealth when expenses are low, because a
premium must be paid), insurance may cause a positive "wealth effect" on use. This will occur if
higher levels of wealth stimulate spending, and if this wealth effect in the high expenditure situation
offsets the depressing effect of lower disposable wealth in the low expenditure state. Any insurance
potentially has such a wealth effect; this effect would not be regarded as arising from a distortion in
incentives, and does not cause inefficiency. See De Meza, Health Insurance and the Demandfor Medical
Care, 2J. HEALTH ECON. 47 (1983). But medical insurance also has a user price effect. This incentive
effect is regarded as a distortion, since the effect of insurance is to make expensive medical care
appear to be cheap to the user, and therefore to stimulate the potential use of care whose value to the
patient is less than its cost.
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health insurance do more than transfer wealth from lucky (well) states to
unlucky (sick) states; they also affect the quantity, quality, and price of the
services the buyer of medical care will select. Intentionally or not, any health
insurer that offers something other than "classical indemnity" coverage will
affect the medical care choices of its insureds. 6 The reason is that
conventional insurance typically reduces the user price-the price paid out of
pocket when one uses additional care-and this lower price causes the
quantity of services demanded to increase. 7 At a minimum, the insurer will
have to take these effects into account in setting premiums. But because most
of these induced changes are really the result of distorted incentives to
medical care buyers, the insurer will be sorely tempted to try to exercise some
direct control over medical prices, quantity, quality, and rate of technical
change. Some of the most exciting innovations in health insurance represent
imaginative ways to exercise this control. 8 The upshot is that health insurers
compete on more than just price; they compete on the basis of the methods
they choose for cost control in the medical services market. This fact
inextricably links health insurance markets and medical services markets; for
all practical purposes risk spreading and cost control are joint products of a
health insurer, with some variation in proportions possible (just as a rancher
can breed for meat or hides), but with complete separation impossible. This
article will take a "variable joint product" perspective on health insurance.
The important thing to note is that the reason why the insurer finds it
advantageous to interfere in transactions with providers springs largely from
the distorted incentives offered by insurance.
This joint product nature of insurance and services gives rise to a paradox,
a Catch 22, which bedevils attempts to understand competition in both health
insurance and medical services. The insurer can affect the physical quantity of
medical services by means of the extent of coverage, although even here the
desire of physicians to adopt standard operating procedures in treating
patients may limit the scope of adjustment for any single insurer. But if the
insurer hopes to affect the quality or price, it will frequently have to change
the decisions about those variables that producers of services would otherwise
make. Viewed as a single competitive buyer, the insurer in a theoretically
competitive market would not usually be given the power to affect price or
average quality. That is, in competition buyers are always "price takers." The
perfectly competitive insurer probably cannot affect the range of quality
offerings either, at least not directly. And any impact on the quantity of
6. Here I am distinguishing between "classical indemnity insurance," which pays a fixed dollar
amount conditional on the occurrence of an event over which the insured has no control whatever,
and the "indemnity function of health insurance," which is the payment by insurance of medical bills,
but for which consumers may have some choice as to the level of care used, and the level of bills
incurred.
7. See supra note 5.
8. These innovations include Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO's"), Preferred
Provider Organizations ("PPO's"), and various types of utilization management devices used by
conventional insurers. Such devices will be discussed in more detail below. See infra text
accompanying note 68.
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services used must come from the price incentive embodied in less than
complete coverage-deductibles and copayments-which at least in part
contradict the risk-spreading purpose of insurance. Therefore, this article
argues that effective competition in the health insurance market-where
"effective" means "effective in controlling cost"-negates competitive arm'slength relationships in the medical services market. Whether the alternative
relationship should be called one of "market power" remains to be seen, but
one can be sure that it will be something different from textbook perfect
competition.
III
MARKET SHARES IN HEALTH INSURANCE:

FACTS AND THEORY

The most traditional indicator of market power is the market share
possessed by a dominant seller. However, as Landes and Posner have
reminded us, a large market share is only necessary for market power, not
sufficient. 9 The meaning of "market power" used in this article is the
definition suggested by Landes and Posner: the ability to maintain price
profitably above the competitive level for an extended period of time.' 0 The
reason why market share alone is an insufficient indicator of market power is,
according to Landes and Posner, because easy entry into an industry or the
availability of products that are close substitutes may severely constrain any
firm's ability, regardless of its current market share, to set a price different
from the competitive level that increases its profits. ' More precisely, even a
firm with a large share may find that such potential competition limits its
ability to earn higher profits by setting output prices above the competitive
level. Should it raise prices, its large share will evaporate. And yet the long
term ability to earn above-competitive profits by raising prices is the definition
of seller market power.
A.

Blue Cross/Blue Shield Market Shares

The Blue plan typically has the largest market share in any local market,
and Blue plans usually limit their activity to particular geographic areas
(ordinarily a state or part of a state).' 2 The Blue plans' market shares
therefore vary across the areas in which they operate. The nationwide
average market share of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans is shown in Table 1. '3
As indicated in Table 1, the share was approximately 35 percent as of 1983
and had eroded somewhat over the previous eight years, but the share was
9. Landes & Posner, Alarket Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 947 (1981).
10. Since this article will be a discussion of buyer as well as seller market power, a more precise
definition would substitute "the ability to profitably set price which deviates from the competitive
level."
11. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9.
12. However, a few of the Blue plans do compete head-to-head in part of the area in which they
operate.
13. Self-insured plans administered by commercial insurers or by Blue Cross/Blue Shield are
included as part of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield market share.
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TABLE
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE

1

BENEFITS MARKET SHARE,

INSURER WHO ADMINISTERS,

Blue Cross/
Blue Shield

Insurance
Compaines

BY TYPE OF

1983"

HMO

Self-Administered
and Non-Insurer
Third Party
Administrator

1965
45
48
2
5
1975
46
45
4
6
1980
38
46
5
10
1981
37
47
6
11
1982
35
48
6
11
1983
35
48
6
11
*Measured by the percentage of premiums based on the identity of the insurer who administers
the plan.
Source: Arnett & Trapnell, Private Health Insurance: New Measures of a Complex and Changing
Industry, 6 HEALTH CARE. FIN. REV. 31, 34 (1984).

still sizeable. In several states, as Table 2 indicates, the share is greater than
50 percent. The reason for the erosion appears in large part to be a shift to
self-insurance.' 4 The main point to be made, however, is that the level of
market share represented here would, by most rule-of-thumb calculations,
raise concern about market power.' 5 The courts have, however, been
reluctant to apply this mechanical reasoning to insurance markets.1t In the
appellate court decision in KarteU, the court excused large market shares by
pointing directly to the alleged public interest in lowering health care costs
7
and in slowing medical care cost growth.'
An important question is the cause of such a high market share for the
Blues. Identification of causation is necessary to predict consequences. If one
knows the cause of this large market share, one may be able to infer whether
that cause would also be expected to lead to market power.
Insight into the question of causation may come from an examination of
the geographical variation in the market shares of the Blue plans. That
variation is considerable, as Table 2 indicates, and has also varied over time.
In some markets, the Blue share falls below 25 percent, which at least offers
evidence that access to the trade name alone is not sufficient to yield
substantial market share.' 8 But in other markets, the share is over 60 percent
14. Arnett & Trapnell, supra note 1, at 34 show, in a table, that the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
share declined as the self- insured, self-administered, and "administrative services only" shares rose.
15. For a discussion of the relationship of market share to legal definitions of monopoly, see
Miller, Vertical Restraints and Powerful Health Insurers: Exclusionary Conduct Masqueradingas Managed Care,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 195.
16. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 741 U.S. 1029
(1985); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
17. For a discussion of Kartell, see Miller, supra note 15, at 195, 220-24.
18. Frech, Monopoly in Health Insurance: The Economics of Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts,
in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 293, 303 (H. Frech ed. 1988).
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9
and surprisingly stable in the face of the surge in self-insurance and HMO's.'
In all states, however, the Blue plans have by far the largest market share; no
other single commercial insurer has a market share above 10 percent.
TABLE
BLUE SHIELD MARKET SHARES,*

2

1976

AND

1980

AND PHYSICIAN

DISCOUNTS, SELECTED PLANS

Discount
from UCR*"
Share 1976

Share 1980

1980

Massachusetts
Michigan
Florida
Pennsylvania

59
60
34
69

64
60
25
69

28.2
27.5
25.8
20.1

Maryland
California
New Jersey
New York (NYC)
Indiana
Virginia (Richmond)

51
19
53
48
46
41

48
23
51
44
46
40

18.3
17.8
12.9
11.3
10.5
10.1

Illinois (Chicago)
Ohio (Cleveland)
Kentucky
Iowa
Wisconsin (Milwaukee)
Alabama
Ohio (Worthington)
Tennesse (Chattanooga)

28
65
41
54
34
41
39
34

23
53
40
51
29
38
38
37

9.9
9.6
8.9
4.0
3.0
2.9
1.9
1.0

PLAN

Summary:
Average Share, 1980,

Discount greater than 20%:
Discount 10-20%:
Discount less than 10%:

65
42
39

Percent of total population with private health insurance.
.Usual, customary and reasonable fees.
Sources: Frech, Monopoly in Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 303 (H. Frech ed.
1988); BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS'NS, FACT BOOK (1977).

B.

Determinants of Blue Market Shares

Analytic studies indicate three types of variables to explain cross-state
variation in share. 20 One set of variables refers to what might be called

19. Id.
20. All of these studies refer to the 1970's, and there has been no study that has tried to explain
the changes over time in market share across areas. See Arnould & Eisenstadt, The Effect of ProviderControlled Blue Shield Plans: Regulatory Options, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH

CARE 339, 341 (M. Olsen ed. 1981); Adamache & Sloan, Competition Between Non-Profit and For-Profit
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"market niche," and the other set refers to regulatory and tax advantages
available to the Blues in some states. The first set of variables is supposed to
capture measures of disproportionally high demand for the type of insurance
product-full coverage, service benefit, and free choice of providerproduced by the Blues. The other set of variables refers to the exemption
from premium taxation and reserves requirements which is extended to the
Blues in some states. There is a third set of influences sometimes discussed.
These influences refer to provider boycotts and/or special price discounts
offered by providers for the purpose of assisting a provider-dominated
2
insurer. '

Empirical studies always find that market niche variables help to predict
Blue market shares. For instance, Adamache and Sloan 2 2 found urbanization
23
and unionization to be positive influences, while Feldman and Greenberg
found income to be a negative influence.2 4 Unions have historically preferred
the "first dollar" coverage the Blues offer. High income might also be
expected to lead to higher desired levels of coverage but it may also be that
higher income consumers have less need of first dollar coverage.2 5 Although
Adamache and Sloan do not give an explanation, the reason why urbanization
would predict a high Blue share is presumably based on a correlation between
urbanization and the type of employer who prefers Blue coverage.
States often impose excise taxes on insurance premiums, but the Blues

often are exempt from those taxes. 26 A premium tax advantage for the Blues,
relative to commercial insurers, was found to be related to market share by
Feldman and Greenberg for plans that also receive discounts on the price of
medical care, but not for plans receiving no discounts. 2 7 In contrast,
Adamache and Sloan found no appreciable effect of tax advantages on either
selling cost or market share for the full set of insurers. 28 Arnould and
Eisenstadt argue that a premium tax advantage combined with provider
control leads only to higher provider prices, with no effect on market share. 2 9
But the tax advantage will lead to higher market share, and lower provider
prices, if the insurance plan is controlled by management that is independent
of doctors or hospitals.
Health Insurers, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 225, 237 (1983); Feldman & Greenberg, The Relationship between
Blue Cross Market Share and the Blue Cross "Discount" on Hospital Charges, 48J. RISK INS. 235, 240 (1981 ).
21. Arnould & Eisenstadt, supra note 20, at 341.
22. Adamache & Sloan, supra note 20, at 237.
23. Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 240.
24. Adamache and Sloan defined urbanization as "a proportion of Blue Cross area population in
standard metropolitan statistical areas" and unionization as "proportional state non-agricultural
work force unionized." Feldman and Greenberg have defined income as state per capita income. See
generally Adamache & Sloan, supra note 20; Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20.
25. Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 239.
26. Congressional Research Service, A Primer on Health Insurance, in HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE
UNINSURED 15 (1988).
27. Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 239.
28. Adamache & Sloan, supra note 20, at 240, 242.
29. Arnould & Eisenstadt, supra note 20, at 355.

Page 237: Spring 19881

COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS

Still another potential influence on an insurer's share is whether it receives
a discount from the posted price of the medical care it covers. As Table 2
shows, there is a strong relationship between discounts and share. But there
is a critical problem in determining whether discounts affect shares: discounts
surely are not exogenous and may themselves be causes of market power as
well as influences on it. Economists have attempted to untangle those
relationships, with mixed results. Frech and Ginsburg were the first to point
out the positive relationship between discounts and market share.3 °( Feldman
and Greenberg found that the existence of a hospital discount increases Blue
Cross market share, but concluded that market share does not affect the
chance of obtaining a discount. 3 ' Adamache and Sloan, in partial contrast,
found that Blue Cross market share does affect the size of the hospital
33
discount 3 2 and that the discount affects market share.
There is also likely to be an interaction between tax advantage and "niche"
variables. If a Blue plan has some positive levels of tax advantages, and if it
applies those advantages to yield a lower premium for the type of insurance in
which it specializes, it will obviously have a large market share in that type of
insurance. The larger the proportion of the population that prefers that type
of insurance, the bigger its overall market share will be. If, in contrast, the
Blue plan has no tax advantage over other insurers, it would not, without
more, be expected to garner a very large share even in the type of insurance in
which it specializes. Consequently, the market niche variables may also be
expected to have stronger effects when the tax advantage is present. No one
has tested this conjecture.
However, the power from tax advantages is limited. 34 The exogenous
sources of insurer market power other than governmental action (for
example, tax subsidies) remain a mystery. Solving this mystery is important,
because the "tax advantage" theory of market power has some serious
problems as a rationale for (or against) antitrust concerns, especially federal
antitrust concerns as applied to health insurance.
States have chosen to give premium tax advantages to Blue Cross and Blue
Shield and to regulate them in ways that differ from the methods applied to
other insurers. 35 In so doing, a state would be presumed to be complying
with federal antitrust requirements by acting in what it regards as the public
30.
SECTOR:

Frech & Ginsburg, Competition Among Health Insurers, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 181 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978).

31. Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20, at 246.
32. Adamache & Sloan, supra note 20, at 234.
33. Id. In all cases, the results are only as good as the exogenous variables that identify the
relationships. For instance, in the Adamache and Sloan study, the only significant exogenous
influence on the size of the discount was state rate-setting authority over the Blue Cross premium,
which hardly seems like a source of market power. Feldman and Greenberg, supra note 20, at 238,
use the percentage of a state's population with any insurance coverage as an exogenous variable, but
one could argue that a Blue Cross discount would, by lowering price, increase that percentage, as
well as Blue Cross' own market share.
34. See infra text accompanying note 45.
35. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 26, at 15.
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interest and taking appropriate account of whatever monopolistic
inefficiencies might arise from giving market advantages to the Blue plans.
Indeed, the McCarran-Ferguson Act explicitly precludes the general
application of federal antitrust laws to state regulated insurers, presuming
36 If
that the state will guard against damaging exercise of market power.
states choose to offer advantages, how can the results of these legislative
choices be challenged?
Perhaps more seriously, because the extent of market distortion is
determined by the extent of market power, the level of distortion is limited by
the size of the premium tax advantage. Suppose, for instance, that the source
of market power is exemption of Blue Cross/Blue Shield from a typical 2
percent state premium tax that is imposed on other insurers. 37 This
advantage, as Frech and Ginsburg have noted, could allow Blue Cross/Blue
Shield to obtain 100 percent of the market if it was as efficient as commercial
insurers. 3 8 If, instead of having market share as its goal, a provider
dominated insurer wanted to increase the profits of providers, it might set
more generous maximum provider prices than would commercial insurers,
prices in excess of some assumed competitive provider level. The critical
point, however, is that the maximum advantage it could transfer to providers
is 2 percent of total premiums-the level of the tax advantage. If it were to
permit a price level for providers higher than that level, commercial insurers
would be able to underprice its break-even premiums. It is in this sense that
tax-based market power is limited.
How great a distortion would be implied by a 2 percent tax advantage?
The answer, theory suggests, depends on the prevailing level of
administrative expense, the elasticity of demand for insurance, and the supply
conditions for insurance. Precise estimates are impossible at present, but the
distortion is likely to be small relative to total health insurance premiums. It
39
can, however, be larger relative to the administrative cost of insurance.
Suppose, as Frech has suggested, that Blue Cross insurers adopt an all-ornothing strategy, choosing to offer only high coverage policies which
stimulate demand for provider services. Here again, the buyer will buy such
coverage only if he is no worse off then he would be if he purchased
commercial insurance. This limits the distortion, the excessive coverage that
a Blue plan can impose. If we conceptually define the distortion as the net
money subsidy that the consumer must receive as an incentive to purchase the
Blue policy, the distortion cannot exceed 2 percent of commercial insurance
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1983).
37. The federal corporate income tax exemption of the Blue plans has recently been reduced
somewhat, but it is the state premium excise tax which is quantitatively much more important.
38. Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 170.
39. Suppose that the 2% premium tax advantage is 20% of a typical 10% group insurance
administrative cost. Suppose also that the elasticity of demand for insurance is 0.5. Then a rough
estimate of the difference between the value of coverage and its cost would be 5% (0.5 X 0.1) of total
administrative cost. If, however, the Blues respond to the tax advantage not by increasing profit but
by spending on wasteful administrative costs, the level of waste could be as great as the 2% tax
advantage itself. That is nearly 20% of all insurer administrative cost, but 2% of total premiums.
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premiums. At conventional group insurance loadings of approximately 10
percent, a 2 percent advantage is significant relative to total administrative
cost. 40 But as a fraction of total benefits, the distortion is relatively small.
Few major sources of market power other than the tax subsidy have been
identified, and even the influence of the tax subsidy is questioned by some
studies. 4' When populations are more likely to demand the type of coverage
Blue Cross and Blue Shield offer, its market share tends to be higher. But
what accounts for this high market share in the first place, and how can it be
sustained? Put slightly differently, what advantage do the Blues have that
cannot easily be copied by other insurers? Other insurers could (and do) offer
the same kind of coverage, and should at least be able to duplicate what the
Blues can offer. The investigation of this question will now be pursued in
detail.
IV
COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR INDEMNITY INSURANCE

To analyze the joint product relationship, we first consider the prospects
for competition among insurers in providing "pure" insurance. Such
insurance may be defined as coverage that simply pools the risk of large
medical expenses, and does not attempt any direct influence on the price,
quality, or quantity of care. One way to represent such a market is to imagine
that all insurance is restricted to the indemnity function. The insurance
simply pays up to a fixed dollar amount, based on the evidence of medical
expenditures. That is, the insurer-qua-insurer, simplyfinances the medical care
cost.
This health insurer performs the four fundamental functions performed by
any insurer:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Selling;
Collection of premiums;
Verifying and paying claims; and
Pooling risk.

Cost is always incurred for the first three functions. The pooling function
is not itself necessarily resource-using. By the law of large numbers, if many
independent risks are pooled, the risk that actual benefit payments per
insured (and therefore actual profits per insured, given some premium)
deviate from their average or expected value is miniscule. When individuals
are risk-averse, the pooling of risk will increase their expected utility. This
means that payments in excess of the expected value of losses could in
principle be extracted from consumers However, if stockholders' risk is
reduced by the law of large numbers, competition will prevent such
consumers' surplus from being claimed by insurers. That is, if pooling
40.
41.

Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 170.
Adamache & Sloan, supra note 20, at 240.
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reduces risk, and if pooling itself is virtually costless, there will be no need to
include a cost of pooling in the premium.
In a competitive market the price of insurance (best measured by the
loading per dollar of benefits) must cover the first three costs. 4 2 If the only

risk was the riskiness of illness, and if the occurrence of illness is independent,
then only those costs will need to be covered. 4 3 However, the insurer must
also forecast future fluctuations in health care costs; there may be some risk
that is not "poolable." On the other hand, because premiums are collected in
advance of benefit payments, there will be a modest return on those accruals.
At least that portion of the insurer's risk portfolio that is correlated with
systematic economy-wide risk will require a return on equity equal to the
return on equity of similar risk elsewhere in the economy.
Monopoly power for a group indemnity insurer, of whatever source, is
likely to be severely limited. The main limitation to such market power, for
group insurance, is that the employer can bear the risk, leaving only the
clerical functions to be contracted out. 4 4 An employer of reasonable size can
pool almost all of the risk himself, at zero cost, by self-insuring. Smaller
employers can band together and self-insure. Any insurer that tries to charge
more than necessary to cover clerical cost will find group customers turning to
self-insurance.
Moreover, if a firm is owned by an individual with a diversified portfolio of
assets, the firm should be willing to absorb some of the systematic risk. For
example, the risk that medical care prices will rise at a different rate than
expected cannot be reduced by pooling across individual buyers of insurance,
since all are equally affected by prices. However, the impact of fluctuating
medical care prices on profits received by the owner of the firm can be
"diversified away" if the owner or owners also have a mix of other
investments. Then when medical costs rise less rapidly than expected, some
other input and output prices will fluctuate in the opposite direction, so that
there will be little effect on the average return from investment portfolios.
This means that the owner of a self-insured small firm that forms part of a
diversified portfolio could, in principle, self-insure and pool medical price risk
with the risks associated with his other investments.
Finally, entry into the insurance business per se is relatively easy, and the
industry is relatively unconcentrated. States license insurance companies, but
the number of insurers licensed to sell in a state is typically in the hundreds.
There are relatively low minimum capital requirements and requirements to
file individual premium rates (group rates are usually not subject to
42. The insurance premium will also include the cost of benefits to be paid, but this is not part of
the cost of the insurance function per se.
43. A risk is independent if the probability that one person contracts an illness is not changed
when another person gets an illness. Independence is not a reasonable assumption for contagious
disease, but expenses for contagious disease treatment are relatively small.
44. About 32% of all workers are currently covered by self-insured and minimum premium
plans. Many other plans are experience-rated, which can be closely analogous to self-insurance. See
Arnett & Trapnell, supra note I, at 34.
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regulation). While no study of entry into health insurance has been
conducted, Munch and Smallwood did find that stricter reserves requirements
deterred entry by new small firms into property-casualty insurance. 4 5 The
deterrent effect does not apply, however, to already established firms seeking
to enter new geographic areas, and the reserve requirements for health
insurance are small in any case, since (in contrast to liability insurance) there
is not a long lag between receipt of premiums and payment of benefits. In
short, while entry is not completely free, barriers are so minimal that no
appreciable amount of market power could be generated. And, as noted
above, other than the Blues there is no insurer in any geographic market with
a large market share. Literally hundreds of firms typically operate and, at
least for the risk-pooling function, would be willing to accept large amounts of
business.
The use of group experience rating reduces the need for actuarial data,
and such data for standard populations are widely available anyway. Large
nationwide insurers can easily set up the clerical facilities to enter separate
localities. In short, other than in the area of tax subsidies, there is at present
little scope for insurer market power in performance of the conventional
indemnity functions, at least if consumers are knowledgeable.
However, not all consumers are knowledgeable about price or quality.
The "quality" of insurance is an imprecise concept, especially for the
indemnity function. The probability of default is largely governed by
regulation of reserves, so that qualitative differences are limited to the
efficiency of premium collection, the speed and accuracy of claims processing,
and the attractiveness of the selling effort. Some consumer/buyers may be
less than perfectly informed about quality and (especially) price, and this
absence of information may in principle permit insurers to raise price
appreciably above the competitive level. With group insurance the
predominant form of sale, and with firm benefit managers the predominant
buyers, it is unlikely that such gains could be large or permanent.
Consumer information imperfections could (and probably do) characterize
the relatively small individual insurance market. Even here, reasonably free
entry is probably sufficient to bid profits down to the competitive level, so that
the main consequence of consumer ignorance for the risk-pooling function is
not market power for any one insurer, but rather excessive selling costs and
46
consumer misjudgment of the relative merits of different insurers.

These comments are not the same thing as saying that no insurer will be
able to garner a large share of the market. Even a small cost advantage to one
insurer can permit that insurer to capture a large market share, especially if
(as in the case of indemnity insurance) the product itself is undifferentiated.
This situation occurs because buyers with no other reason to prefer an insurer
45. See generally Munch & Smallwood, Solvency Regulation in the Property-LiabilityInsurance Industry:
Empirical Evidence, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 261 (1980).
46. But see infra p. 267 (Part VII) for a discussion of the role of consumer ignorance and the cost
containment function.
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than price will all select the insurer with the lowest price. But the ability to
raise price above the competitive level will simply not exist. If the large share
insurer should try to raise price, it will find multiple competitors who will
match its price as soon as it uses up its cost advantage.
It is true that there may be some advantages to the health insurer who first
offers a type of health insurance coverage. Until buyers can observe or get
information about performance, they may prefer an insurer they know they
can count on for benefit payments as compared to a new entrant. However,
reserves and solvency regulation do largely guarantee benefit payments. In
group insurance the failure to pay benefits in a timely fashion would quickly
become apparent. Consequently, it is difficult to believe that there can be any
important first entrant market power in performing indemnity insurance
functions for groups. (There may be a modest amount of such market power
in the individual insurance market, as will be discussed below.)
V
INSURER-PROVIDER RELATIONSHIPS AND THE
EXPANSION OF MARKET POWER

A.

Forms of Monopsony Market Power

A critical element in modelling competition is therefore the ability of an
insurer to be more than just a financer of indemnities who leaves untouched
the prices providers charge and the mix of services they provide; the insurer
can become a buyer of services. 4 7 That is, absent the ability to affect provider
price, quantity, or quality, it would be very difficult for the health insurance
market to be non-competitive, except temporarily or as the result of an
explicit conspiracy or government regulation that strictly limits entry. And
the possibility of self-insurance means that even such barriers would have
limited effect on many employers and employees. In the sections that follow,
this article will explore in more detail how the insurer's ability to have a direct
effect on prices or quantities is the key to understanding competition in the
health insurance industry.
Once one admits the possibility that insurance may affect the price or
quantity of medical services in a way that differs from the effect of indemnity
insurance as sold by competitive insurers, one has to consider a variety of
possible objectives for insurers and a variety of possible strategies. Confusion

arises in choosing appropriate theories and in interpreting evidence when the
various possibilities are not distinguished. Table 3 provides a classification of
models. The control over the insurer may either be held de facto by providers
47. The argument here is that, depending on the circumstances, the insurer can either function as
financer or buyer. There is no direct economic rationale that prescribes one function over another.
If the insurer does function as a financer, moral hazard means that insurance will affect the quantity
of care demanded. If a larger quantity requires a higher price to be paid to suppliers, then price will
also be affected. But the financer-insurer does not have any direct effect on price or quantity beyond
these supply-demand effects, that is, beyond the effects that would have occurred had the quantity
demanded increased for any other reason.
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organized collectively (hospitals in the case of Blue Cross; physicians in the
case of Blue Shield), or by insurance management. Control obviously
determines the objectives the insurer would pursue with any market power
available. The tools for control to be discussed are: (1) effecting a uniform
price charged to all patients; (2) causing a lower, discriminatory price for the
insured's customers only (with the possibility that both the size of discount
and the level of all prices will be affected); and (3) affecting the volume of
services provided.
Indicated in the Table are some examples of past discussions of insurer
market power that have focused on these six alternative cases. While the
precise objectives of providers and insurers (especially when either or both
are not-for-profit) are uncertain, we can provisionally assume that provider
objectives are furthered, other things being equal, by higher overall provider
price or benefit levels and/or larger quantities of medical services, while
insurance management in contrast desires lower total benefits cost.
TABLE
FORM OF CONTROL/

UNIFORM PRICE

3
DISCRIMINATORY

QUANTITY

PRICE

CONTROL

'
Provider

Insurance
Management

Oregon Phys.
Services4 8
Lynk Theor of
Oregon Case 0

Blue Cross
Discount
(traditional)
Ball Memorial 5 '

Frech-

Ginsburg
"Coverage
Forcing"49
Overly
Aggressive
Case
Management

The analysis will begin with the case in which discounting is not an issue; the
insurer is simply trying to set price.
Oregon Physicians Services 52 (Blue Shield), as interpreted by Goldberg
and Greenberg, would qualify as an example of Cell 1:53 a providercontrolled, overall price-increasing plan. Oregon Physicians Services, the
state physician-organized and controlled Blue Shield plan, was charged with
attempting to set provider prices higher than other insurers (called "hospital
associations") in the late 1930's, and to persuade physicians not to deal with
the hospital associations. While the Supreme Court acquitted Oregon
Physicians Services, Goldberg and Greenberg nevertheless support the view
48. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). (This Table refers to the
conduct of Oregon Physicians Services, which is discussed in the cited case.)
49. Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 173.
50. W. LYNK, THE ANCESTARY OF PHYSICIAN-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE (Health Econ.
Resource Dept. working paper, Blue Cross Blue Shield Associations, June 1978).
51. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986), rehg
denied, 788 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1986).
52. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
53. See generally Goldberg & Greenberg, The Emergence of Physician-SponsoredHealth Insurance: A
Historical Perspective, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 288

(W. Greenberg ed. 1987).
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that the Blue Shield plan was a provider-dominated plan with market power.
In contrast, Lynk alleged that the Oregon hospital associations were trying to
hold down overall provider prices, as in Cell 4, behaving in a monopsonistic
way. 5 4 Since there is no easy way to establish what the competitive price
would have been, this issue is not resolved.
Cells 2 and 5 deal with prices that are set lower for the insurer's customers
than for others. The provider-dominated insurer that, nevertheless, sets
lower prices than its competitors features in more recent versions of the Blue
Cross discount discussion (for example, Feldman and Greenberg), 55 although
there is usually some ambiguity about the objectives of the insurer. A case in
which the insurer is unequivocally alleged to have discriminatory overall
price-depressing objectives is represented by the argument of the plaintiffs in
Ball AIemorial. 56 Here the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that a Blue Crosssponsored preferred provider organization ("PPO") had compelled some
hospitals to accept prices that were inappropriately low. 5 7 Finally, Cells 3 and

6 describe another avenue for the vertical relationship between insurer and
provider. Fears that HMO's or PPO's could be overly aggressive in utilization
management have been expressed, as in Cell 6.58 In contrast, other articles
have argued that provider-dominated insurers may cause overuse of medical
services by forcing excessive levels of insurance coverage. 5 9 If such a
provider-dominated insurer possessed market power, it would not, as Frech
and Ginsburg 60 have noted, be expected to try to maximize insurer profits,
since higher insurer profits could well mean lower payments to providers.
Nor could the insurer pay dividends to providers even if provider associations
have nominal ownership. There are, however, two ways in which it can legally
transfer rents to its provider-owners. One way has been described by Frech: 6'
By offering coverage that increases or at least does not limit the quantity of
services demanded at any provider price, net incomes of providers will be
enhanced. Another way to transfer rents is by setting benefit payments that
result in prices that are higher than the competitive level. 62 Either way, the

net effect is to cause insurer premiums to be higher than the level under pure
54. W. LYNK, supra note 50, at 23.
55. Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20.
56. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, reh g denied, 788 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1986).
57. See Miller, supra note 15, at 195, 226-30.
58. See generally Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?,
317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987).
59. H. Frech, Market Power in Health Insurance: Effects on Insurance and Medical Markets, J. INDUS.
ECON. 28, 59 (1979); see generally Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 30.
60. See Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 169.
61. See Frech, supra note 59, at 56.
62. Typically service-benefits insurers, such as Blue Cross, do set actual prices paid to hospitals;
as part of its Blue Cross contract, the hospital agrees to provide benefits in the form of services for
this price, and not to bill patients for anything additional. In contrast, most Blue Shield plans set a
maximum benefit level, with the physician permitted to bill for more than the benefit level. However,
it is easy to see that the higher the benefit level, the higher the price the physician will be able to
charge.
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indemnity insurance produced by an insurer with the same costs, and to cause
provider net incomes likewise to exceed the level under indemnity insurance.
There are two ways of effecting this strategy. The most straightforward is
for the insurer to set high provider benefits, and then set break-even
insurance premiums high enough to cover the claims these benefit levels
require. An alternative strategy, which Frech has proposed, is to offer only
very high coverage policies, to refuse or discourage policies with deductibles
and copayments, and to count on moral hazard from generous coverage to
63
increase provider price, quantity, and incomes.
While all of these cases are possible, the major point of this article is that
the key to understanding insurer market power (if it is to exist) is as the result
of discriminatory input pricing behavior. While market power is not ruled out in
the non-discriminatory price or quantity-manipulation cases, it is much more
limited.
Described below is a model that does lead to the conclusion that market
power in excess of current tax or regulatory advantages is possible. This
market power is exercised against providers; it represents monopsony rather
than monopoly power. Also considered is an argument that investigates the
possibility of transforming monopsony power into monopoly power in the
form of higher prices charged to some buyers.
B.

Monopsony Power for the Management-Dominated Insurer
This model makes the following assumptions:
1. One insurer initially has a large market share in the local market to be analyzed,
while the other insurers' shares in the market are much smaller.
2. Each provider would be willing to accept a lower price rather than experience a
substantial drop in volume from current levels. Explored below is a variety of
conditions that can yield this motivation.
3. The initial provider price equals long-run marginal and average cost (that is, it is
competitive) .64
4. Each provider must, because of fixed costs and the geographically limited nature
of medical services markets, serve customers of the dominant insurer as well as the
customers of other insurers.

Given these four assumptions, the following strategy is pursued by a
management-controlled dominant (large market share) insurer. It proposes
to a provider that the provider accept a price from it that is less than the initial
price. With regard to prices paid by other insurers, the provider may either
be free to set whatever price it wishes for the fringe (small market share)
insurers' customers, or the dominant insurer may require a specific price,
higher than the price it is paying and possibly higher than the initial price, to
be charged to those customers.
63. See Frech, supra note 59, at 59.
64. Long-run marginal cost means the change in total cost caused by varying output by one unit
when all inputs are free to adjust. Long-run average cost is total cost divided by output.
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Will the provider accept this proposal? Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck
offer a basis for a negative answer. 6 5 They allege that, rather than give a
discount, providers would simply switch to other insurers and that all patients
(buyers) will follow their current provider rather than stay with their current
(dominant) insurer. The implicit threat to the provider rejecting the discount
request is the potential departure of a sizeable chunk of its volume. However,
if the provider does not expect the insurer to be able to "control" patients,
there is no reason to give it a discount. The dominant insurer may be unable
to withhold purchases because patients prefer a particular provider and
because patients can and will switch insurers if the dominant insurer tries to
switch them. The Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck argument appears to state
that if the insurance premium is the same for the dominant insurer and the
alternatives, then providers will not believe that patients will follow the
insurer's directions to avoid the recalcitrant provider. They say that, unless
there is brand loyalty (which they believe to be unimportant), there is no
66
reason for patients to be willing to follow insurer orders.
The argument, in this form, appears to overlook an important step. The
insurer expecting to extract a discount can set its premium at a level high
enough to cover the discounted costs, below that of other insurers who must
pay "full price." So even if there is absolutely no brand loyalty, the loyalty of
any smart purchaser to the best price will be enough to make the insurer
attractive and the threat to withdraw credible.
It is, however, possible to support the Staten, Dunkelberg, and Umbeck
argument if one imagines that all providers collude and refuse discount
requests. But such behavior, in addition to being unlikely, might raise
antitrust problems of its own. Moreover, the only requirement for a threat to
be credible is that enough buyers are willing to follow their insurer, not that all
67
are willing to do so.

As noted above, most insurance is offered in connection with employment.
However, many employers now offer a PPO option, which carries lower
premiums or better benefits in return for use of a particular subset of
preferred providers. A few employers are furnishing only PPO or HMO
coverage to their employees, 6 8 thus strengthening the threat of the insurer to
switch patients.
It is an initial large market share that will give a management-controlled
dominant insurer a persuasive threat to providers. This large share can,
through the process just described, be used to extract a discount, and then the
discount can be used to support a premium lower than that which is
65. Staten, Dunkelberg & Umbeck, Market Share and the Illusion of Market Power: Can Blue Cross
Force Hospitals to Discount?, 6J. HEALTH ECON. 43, 50 (1987).
66. Id. at 49.
67. Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, 7J. HEALTH ECON., 120 (1988);
Pauly, Reply, 7J. HEALTH ECON. 85 (1985).
68. Kramon, Employers Test New Ways to Shift Risk on Health Costs, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1988, at 1,
col. 1.
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financially feasible for any other insurer. The lower premium in turn permits
the large market share to be sustained.
The discount announced by a dominant insurer thus becomes a selffulfilling prophecy (which Frech has called a vicious circle). 60 To begin this
circle, only an initial large market share is required.
It is also possible to give an "entry barrier" interpretation to this strategic
advantage. An entry barrier may be said to exist if a new entrant does not
have access to the same demand-side and cost-side conditions as is true of
existing firms. If an existing large insurer can obtain a critical input-medical
service-at a lower price than a new firm, a barrier to entry may be said to
exist. Even if a new firm has the same access to customers as existing firms,
there is still a barrier if it has less favorable access to medical services. While
capital is usually thought to be the input that new entrants have difficulty
acquiring on equal terms with existing firms, that difficulty can in principle
apply to other inputs as well.
This is obviously an oligopsony game, and there are probably some
counter-strategies by the provider or providers that could defeat the
dominant insurer. For instance, the provider could threaten to offer an even
lower price to another insurer, thus causing the dominant insurer to lose its
share of the provider's customers. On the other hand, the provider could
attempt to conclude an agreement with other insurers that would yield
volume sufficient to achieve minimum cost even without any dominant insurer
business. Of critical empirical importance is the credibility of an insurer's
threat to withdraw business, or to offer less attractive coverage (for example,
indemnity coverage with a 20 percent copayment to non-participating
providers), relative, to the credibility of a provider's threat to deal entirely with
non-dominant insurers. Here one may conjecture that a Blue Cross or Blue
Shield threat to withdraw business or selectively reduce coverage would be
taken seriously by many health care providers as long as the provider itself did
not have a virtual monopoly in the market area; the option of entirely
replacing those customers by insureds of other insurers would not be taken
seriously. The strategy of contracting exclusively with other insurers is
inhibited by the geographic nature of medical service markets and the
presence of fixed costs.
This strategic explanation can be matched with Easterbrook's assertion
about health insurance: that "[Health insurer] monopsony is inconceivable in
most cases." 70 His argument is as follows:
[A]ny group of insurance companies that sought to curtail the use of medical care
enough to depress [provider] prices would cause consumers to go elsewhere for
insurance, and physicians would withdraw from the plan. Firms offering coverage
sufficient to purchase the quantity of services patients desired would have an
advantage in selling policies. Thus if the monopsony explanation prevailed, the
insurers subscribing to the maximum price plan would lose market share, as happens
when monopoly is at work. If the share of firms (buyers or sellers) participating in this
69.
70.

Frech, supra note 18, at 301.
Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U.

CHI.

L.

REV.

886, 904 (1981).
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arrangement is increasing,-1 this indicates efficiency-creating behavior rather than
monopoly or monopsony.

One immediate problem with this argument is that Easterbrook has the
initial sequence of events backwards. The monopsonist does not "curtail use"
to depress price, but rather depresses provider price first with the consequence
of curtailing use as providers supply less care. 7 2 But the more crucial point is
the failure to notice that, if price can be successfully depressed by an insurer
or set of insurers below what others are paying, the insurer could depress its
premium and still cover costs. It is the lower premium, attractive to and
providing benefits to buyers of insurance, that can sustain the differential
insurer monopsony once it is achieved. This lower premium can more than
offset the limitation on quantity (even the frustration of excess demand) that
final consumers will experience in a monopsony insurance plan. Consumers
will hate the limitation but console themselves by loving the low premium.
To be sure, an insurer with a smaller market share might likewise request a
similar discount from a provider and threaten to take its small share
elsewhere. At a minimum, the discount offered to such a firm would be lower,
and the provider might, as a matter of strategy, more reasonably refuse such a
request. In effect, the modest award of monopoly (insurance-selling) market
power conveyed by such things as premium tax exemptions, if used to yield
large market share, can be parlayed into possibly sizeable monopsony market
power in purchasing inputs.
To sum up: A large market share, however acquired, provides a credible
threat to an insurer dealing with an individual provider (doctor or hospital) as
long as the provider would have even less profit if the threat were to be
carried out than is represented by the discount request. The only way a
provider could counter this strategy would be to locate another insurer who
could replace the lost customers-whether by bringing them from elsewhere
or by replacing the dominant insurer for its current set of customers.
However, in most health care/health insurance markets there does not seem
to be a candidate for this "white knight" role.
C.

Discounting and Provider-Dominated Insurers

Up to this point it has been assumed that the discount is part of a strategy
by a management-dominated insurer intended to reduce the payments to
providers. In this section it is shown that a discount could even be an
attractive strategy to a provider-dominated insurer. 7 3 This explanation will at
least help to resolve a paradox in the economic history of health insurance:
why it was that even allegedly provider-dominated insurers imposed
71. Id.
72. The monopoly analogue is increasing provider price to curtail quantity demanded.
73. This argument parallels in many ways the explanation offered by Leffler, but does not invoke
the HMO alternative which figures importantly in his discussion. Leffler argues that physiciandominated insurers require discounted prices in order to keep their premiums low enough to keep
out the HMO alternatives. See Leffler, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: Maximum-Price
Agreements in Markets with Insured Buyers, 2 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 187 (1983).
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discounts.74 In the words of a physician dealing with Oregon Blue Shield,
"U]ust why [Blue Shield] should have cut-rate fees (it was the original purpose
in organizing the O.P.S.) in order to fight hospital associations, I cannot see
"75

The critical notion is that the provider-dominated insurer will require a
higher price to be charged to other insurers' customers as a condition of
provider participation in its plan. It will therefore appear that the dominant
insurer will be receiving a discount from the price charged to others. Forcing
such a differential pricing arrangement will, as explained in the previous
section, both be made possible by a large market share and permit that market
share to be sustained. Moreover, such a pricing structure is consistent with an
average price to providers that is above the competitive level.
The explanation is based on the same threat to withdraw business if a
discount is not granted and maintained. Just as before, imagine that an
insurer garners a large market share. The insurer then imposes a set of prices
on the providers. This set might contain a price received from the dominant
insurer that is higher than the competitive level, but a price to be charged to
customers of other insurers which is higher still. At least the average price
received would be higher than the competitive level. The dominant insurer
price is nevertheless "discounted," and myopic providers might well complain
that they would prefer the undiscounted price.
The threat against any provider who might set a lower (non-premium)
price to other insurers is the threat to withdraw dominant insurer business. If
that volume cannot easily be replaced, no individual provider will be willing to
charge a price to other insurers which is not above the price received from the
dominant insurer. This strategy forces any provider who wants to cut price
closer to the competitive level in order to receive a large volume of business
from another insurer to forego business from the dominant insurer. By the
same argument as made above, many providers may find this sanction enough
to give them fortitude to resist the usual competitive temptation to cut price
back closer to marginal cost.
This is the difference between this case and the management-dominated
one. Here the insurer will have to enforce discrimination by concentrating on
the price charged to others, rather than only on the price charged to its
insureds, and will have to threaten to withdraw participation if the price to
others is cut.
The alternative strategy for the dominant insurer is to use the discounted
price advantage to "force" more comprehensive conventional coverage on
74. It is, in contrast, easier to see why a provider-dominated insurer might try to control
utilization directly. Having shifted the demand curve out with high coverage, it might well have
overshot, and want to cut the quantity a little. Decades of Blue Cross ads on detailing costcontainment programs do not describe necessarily virtuous behavior but only the administrative
controls required by generous coverage.
75. Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 53, at 242.
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consumers. 76 In effect, rather than just increasing profits on existing
customers, the insurer induces more insureds to purchase comprehensive
coverage. This strategy may be preferable to a wholly price-based strategy.
Furthermore, it is even possible that a discount from the initial (no insurer
market power) equilibrium price can increase provider income if the initialprice
is above marginalcost for some other reason. For instance, suppose that physicians
would, even in the most competitive practical market, be able to maintain a
price somewhat above the competitive level. Discounting that price slightly,
but using the discount to foster more comprehensive coverage, may actually
increase provider net income.
D.

Other Considerations

What of other reasons for a large market share? A state may give a tax
subsidy to a Blue plan, recognizing that the subsidy will enhance its market
share, as discussed above. But the tax subsidy advantage can be expanded
into monopsony. It is more difficult to argue that the state intended to foster
monopsony.
Perhaps the most interesting issue is that removal of tax or regulatory
privileges will not be sufficient to eliminate monopsony, since the large market
share continues to provide market power. A large share insurer can clone
market power if it can engage in monopsonistic behavior.
A more difficult situation is set forth in the case in which an insurer obtains
a large market share simply by being the initial entrant-by being there first
with what turned out to be a good idea. Yet, success in the open market of
new insurance products can generate monopsony. The appropriate remedies
in this case are, in my opinion, less than obvious.
E.

What Might Market Power Mean in the Health Insurance Case?

The burden of the argument for the management-dominated,
discriminatory pricing case sketched out above is that it is possible that Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans can depress price below the pre-existing level. But
how can such an action ever do damage? Is it not reasonable that, having
declared there to be a problem of high health care costs, society should
applaud the exercise of market power to force these costs down?
The first important point to note is that, in this monopsony case, market
power means the ability of the insurer to force provider price profitably below
the competitive level. This lower price means that, in contrast to the
conventional antitrust case, monopsony does not necessarily reduce
consumer welfare; it may even improve the well-being of consumers-quaconsumers, at least for some consumers. Like monopoly, monopsony reduces
output below the level that maximizes the sum of consumer and producer
76. This is an adaptation of Frech's argument in which Blue Cross and Blue Shield were said to
use market power to force more comprehensive coverage than buyers would have preferred. For an
example, see Frech, supra note 18, at 293-322.
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surpluses. But unlike monopoly, monopsony does not achieve this result by
pushing product price too high; it does so by pushing the price paid to
suppliers too low. That is, monopsony operates on the supply curve rather
than the demand curve; in so doing, it reduces supplier (not demander)
welfare.
Confusion on this simple point is common. Easterbrook, for example,
argues that:
[For insurance companies] to depress prices, they must curtail purchases; the purchase
decision, however, is made by the insured patient, and once the patient has insurance,
the marginal cost of health care is well below the price paid by the insurer. It is hardly
possible to
reduce the consumers' purchases of medical care by lowering the price
77
they pay!

But a moment's reflection will suggest that lowering prices paid to a set of
suppliers will curtail purchases-not because doing so will reduce the quantity
demanded (here Easterbrook is quite right), but because it will reduce the
quantity supplied. After all, "purchases" in a market necessarily equal the
quantity demanded or the quantity supplied, whichever is less.
In the case of monopoly, selling price can be pushed above the
competitive level as long as the firm-level demand curve is not perfectly
elastic. 78

The analogous case for the supplier-provider is that the supply

curve of the input medical services may not be horizontal; either providers do
not produce at constant marginal cost or there is no supply curve because the
provider market is not initially competitive.
If providers are assumed to be profit-maximizing, there are four possible
ways in which a price reduction can be sustained:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

seller monopoly rents may be cut;
quality may be reduced;
quasi-rents may be cut; or
producers' surplus to specialized inputs may be reduced.

The first case is one in which providers are initially charging prices above
the break-even or competitive level, so that positive monopoly rents are being
earned. In this case, the exercise of market power by insurers against
providers represents bilateral bargaining; a buyer with market power is
bargaining with a seller with market power. Buyer market power may be
efficiency-improving if its exercise of market power stops when provider price
has been pushed to the competitive level. Unfortunately, there is no
particular reason why the buyer should stop at this point; the buyer can gain
further monopsony advantages by pushing seller price below the competitive
77.

See Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 904.

78. A firm faces perfectly elastic demand if it imagines that it can sell as much as it wishes at the
current price, but will sell nothing if it tries to charge more than the current market level. Such a firm
is a "price taker." The demand curve is a horizontal line at a price equal to the current market price.
By analogy, the insurer must imagine that, if it depresses the price it pays to providers slightly below
the current level, at least some suppliers will continue to supply some care to its insureds. If
depressing price causes a decrease in the quantity providers are willing to supply, but not an absolute
decrease, the supply curve will have a positive slope. Broadly speaking, I will argue that the supply
curve of care can have this configuration if not all sellers or providers of inputs do not produce at the
same constant long-run marginal cost.
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level. 7 9 Feldman and Greenberg take a benign view of insurer market power
mobilized against prices that are too high.8 0 They apparently anticipate that
the exercise of power will not be carried beyond the point at which prices are
just high enough, but they offer no reason for this anticipation.
The quality-reduction case occurs when quality is variable and there is
some competition among providers. Quality reduction can take many forms:
less time per office visit, longer waiting time, fewer services per hospital stay,
or less technically advanced services. There is a widespread belief among
economists (if not among rhetoric-bound policy makers) that current medical
quality or amenity may well be excessive, in the sense that hospitals provide
overly intensive care, but there is no firm evidence on this point.
Quality may be excessive-carried to a level at which improvements in
quality or amenity are worth less than their cost-because of insuranceinduced moral hazard. For example, a hospital may be willing to provide
under-utilized high technology services because insurance covers the high
price of those services, and because insured consumers have no reason not to
patronize that hospital.
Since monopsony can push quality in the opposite direction, it could, up
to a point, offset this distorted incentive. But, here again, there is no reason
to expect the exercise of market power to stop at the ideal point; it might well
lead to deficient quality, in the form of long waits, a slow rate of technical
progress, and contrived shortages of useful care.
The third case is even more ambiguous. It is possible that current price
just equals long-run marginal cost, but that some suppliers would for a time
still be willing to render services even if price were cut because they have few
short-run alternatives. Physicians, for example, might be receiving incomes
just sufficient to yield the competitive rate of return on their investment in
their education, and yet be receiving "quasi-rents," which are defined as
incomes (and prices) in excess of the amounts needed to induce them to
continue to supply their services in the short run. There are not many
alternative uses for physician training; the sunk-cost nature of education (and
of other kinds of specific capital investments) leads to quasi-rents. In such a
case, price can be reduced and yet services will continue to be supplied as
long as the price cuts only reduce quasi-rents and do not fall below short-run
marginal cost.8 ' The casualty of a lower price is coverage of the cost of
inputs, principally capital, fixed in the short run, but the short run in the case
of medical human capital or hospital buildings can be very long indeed.
Finally, the last case is the classic monopsony case. Monopsony requires
that inputs in the production of some good or service be specialized in the
sense that their value in producing that service exceeds their value in other
uses. It also requires that the specialized inputs differ in the minimum return
79. See Pauly, Reply, supra note 67, at 119.
80. See generally Feldman & Greenberg, supra note 20.
81. Short-run marginal cost refers to the change in total cost from varying output by one unit
when only some inputs (such as human capital) are free to adjust.
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they require to furnish the service in question. Under competition the price
paid to all sellers will be determined by the price required by the last, or
marginal, seller; the other sellers will then earn "infra-marginal rents," in the
sense that the price they receive exceeds the value of their input in the next
best use.
Monopsony, which depresses the price paid to buyers below the
competitive level, will reduce the infra-marginal rents to sellers. There are
indeed specialized inputs to many health services. The implication then is
that monopsony reduces the infra-marginal rents to suppliers of these inputs.
That effect is only a transfer, however; the efficiency loss comes from
restraining the use of critical inputs (and probably outputs) below the level at
which the marginal willingness to pay of consumers equals the marginal
willingness to be paid of suppliers of services.
As an example to illustrate this argument, consider the case of hospital
services, broadly defined, and imagine that nurses provide specialized inputs
to hospitals in a local market according to an upward-sloping supply curve. 8 2
This supply curve reflects the alternatives different nurses have to hospital
nursing in this local market. Now imagine that there is an additional amount
of services nurses could provide (probably defined more as services per
admission rather than as more admissions), but that supply of that increment
would require that more nurses be hired. Imagine also that consumers would
be willing to pay the opportunity cost of this increment; however, increasing
the employment of nurses would drive up nurse wages. The problem is that
the monopsony insurer will take account of the increase in wages to all nurses
(and the increase in the price level of hospital services it would imply), and
judge the improved intensity not to be worth that marginal factor cost. That
is, the monopsony buyer recognizes that the higher wages must be paid not
just to the newly hired nurses, but to all nurse employees. The marginal
factor cost thus exceeds the wages paid to the newly added nurses. Both the
insurer and consumers of insurance are better off not buying these additional
services, since then they avoid paying the rents represented by higher wages
to those nurses who were working at the initial wage level. There is a loss in
welfare, but the loss is not to the marginal consumer. Instead, the loss falls on
the marginal suppliers of nursing services.
This means that monopsony need not injure (or affect) competition in the
final product market, that is, in the market for insurance. Monopsony does its
welfare damage to competition in the input market-in markets for
physicians' services, for hospital care, or for specialized inputs to hospital
care, such as nursing. Antitrust's strong (though not exclusive) focus on
82. That is, more nurses can only be attracted to work at this hospital by increasing wages.
Some nurses, those tied to the local area or with a taste for nursing as a profession, would be willing
to work for lower wages than others. That monopsony can be employed against nurses has been
discussed by commentators on an earlier version of the nurse shortage, but the locus of monopsony
behavior could well be transferred upstream to an insurer. See generally D. YETr, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE NURSE SHORTAGE (1975).
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competition in product markets has obscured a clear statement of how
monopsony should be treated under antitrust law.
If the insurer can control the quantity of services directly, this is the end of
the story. There is no moral hazard in the monopsony case, since the insurer
can control care by manipulating the prices paid to suppliers of medical care.
By holding the price paid to hospitals down, the level of service intensity is
controlled, even though individual insureds may strenuously demand better
nursing care. But the point is that they would not be willing to pay the

premium for the insurance that sets a hospital price high enough to induce
83
that greater level of intensity to be supplied.
A similar argument to that applied to hospital care also applies to
physician services. Individual physicians have upward sloping supply curves
because of the increasing marginal disutility of work. Again, some services
that would be efficient to supply will not in fact be made available if the
insurer exercises full monopsony power. (Interestingly, even if the insurer
was controlled by consumers, it would still behave as a full monopsonist if it
acted in consumers' interest.)
Both the Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurers and the great majority of
hospitals are not-for-profit firms. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that
such firms will, nevertheless, frequently behave in the same way as for-profit
firms, so the previous analysis will apply.8 4 But are there any differences that
the not-for-profit form may cause?
The most frequently discussed answer to this question points to the
possibility of cost-shifting-increasing the price to other customers of the
provider when the dominant insurer compels a lower price.8 5 As noted
elsewhere, the concept of cost-shifting rests on shaky theoretical ground if the
83. A monopsony health insurer could control moral hazard in an efficiency-improving way if it
was motivated to do so. The mechanism, which to my knowledge has been overlooked in the
discussion on moral hazard, is to set the provider price on the upward sloping supply curve of medical care
services that bringsforthjust the quantity of services consumers would demand if they faced a price equal to marginal
cost. See Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, supra note 67, at 119 for further
discussion of this issue. There would still be excess demand, and a need to distribute the "optimal"
total quantity optimally over individual demanders, but such a price-setting mechanism could well be
an improvement. In addition, there might need to be nonprice rationing, or other forms of quality
deterioration. But as long as this cost is not excessive, welfare may be improved. Id. Pauly shows
that if the supply curve slopes upward, there is a price that can bring forth supply of the optimal total
quantity of care, if one could determine beforehand what the optimal quantity is. The point of
relevance here, however, is that one would not expect a profit-seeking monopsonist (or one run in
the interest of consumers) to stop at this (second best) optimal point. Instead, the price would be
pushed down to the monopsony equilibrium.
Note that the welfare-maximizing price would be one that prohibits balance-billing (just as does
the monopsony price). Frech, supra note 18, at 312 has cautioned that removal of out-of-pocket
payments under a ban on balance-billing will stimulate spending, since consumers will surely
demand more when care is free of user chargers. But there is a countervailing force: If providers are
"on their supply curves," they will not be willing to supply the larger quantity buyers demand, and
hence the higher expenses cannot become a reality. The worst that can happen (though it could be
very bad indeed) would be the transaction cost associated with nonprice rationing of excess demand.
84. See generally Pauly, Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets, 77 AMERICAN ECON. REV., 257 (1987).
85. See generally J. MEYER, W. JOHNSON & S. SULLIVAN, PASSING THE HEALTH CARE BUCK: WHO
PAYS THE HIDDEN COST? (1983).
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enterprise is profit-maximizing. 8 6

If, for example, the firm has constant

marginal cost over the relevant range, and if that firm was initially charging
the profit-maximizing price in the fringe market, it should not want to alter
that price just because a discount was negotiated.
If, however, the firm was not-for-profit, it is possible that the initial price
charged to others was below the profit-maximizing level, so that there will be
an increase in that price following a discount to the dominant buyer. 8 7 That
is, faced with a constrained lower price in one market, the not-for-profit
provider may push other prices up closer to the profit-maximizing level. If
the provider itself has some market power, this can mean a price in excess of
the competitive level for some customers.
A final issue concerns the behavior of not-for-profit insurers endowed with
market power and cut loose from provider control. While the precise
objectives of such firms are not known, a plausible story would have them
setting both input and output prices as would a for-profit firm with the same
market power, and then diverting some would-be profits to "dividends-inkind" received by management. If this happens, the potential efficiency
consequences are, paradoxical as it may seem, much worse than if the firm
maximized
profits.
The
reason
is
this:
In
conventional
monopoly/monopsony models, the profits of the firm are only transfers in
welfare economics terms; it is the distortion of price signals which leads to
welfare loss. This loss, while not trivial, is usually small relative to profits
earned. But in the non-profit case, there is real potential that some of those
profits will be wasted, in in-kind wages of management which are worth less
than their cost. In effect, market power allows a firm with inefficient
management-inefficiency in the form of an easy life or an edifice complex
when it comes to headquarters buildings and real estate deals-to survive and
prosper. Here again, it is only clear at present that these things are possible,
but there surely is a threat that could be avoided if the market power were
countered.
F.

Toward Measuring Monopsony Power by Market Share

1. Introduction. An important insight into the conceptual framework thus
far developed can be obtained by considering the relationship between
market share, which is empirically observable, and monopsony market power,
which is not. The classic empirically-based definition of seller (monopoly)
market power has been provided by Lerner, who proposed a useful index to
define, and ultimately measure, market power. 8 8 An adaptation of the Lerner
index to the monopsony case will highlight the critical elements in
86. See generally Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, supra note 67.
87. This point is discussed further by Foster, Cost Shifting Under Cost Reimbursement and Prospective
Payment, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 261, 265-68 (1985), and Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health
Insurance Markets, supra note 67, at 121.
88. See generally Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, I REV.
ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
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determining the existence and size of monopsony market power in health
insurance.
The model for the adaptation of the Lerner index to antitrust
considerations is the Landes-Posner article, which clearly described the
relevant influences needed to be considered in order to arrive at a judgment
about market power. 8 9 Landes and Posner dealt with the general monopoly
case. Those concepts can be adapted to deal with the health insurance
market.
2. Defining the Market. The Lerner index, as discussed by Landes and
Posner, shows how a measure of market share can be modified into an
indicator of market power. To apply this model to health insurance, the
relevant market must be specified in order to define market share at the
outset. The analysis will assume that the insurance market and the market for
medical services are both local, in the sense of being limited to a single city.
This is certainly a reasonable assumption for most medical services. For
monopsony, however, it is the insurer's share in the market for medical
services which is relevant.
3. The Lerner Index. The Lerner monopoly index measures the difference
between the price the seller charges and the seller's (marginal) cost of
output. 90 The analogous monopsony index would equal the difference between
the price paid for an input and its value to the firm. The latter quantity is
simply the marginal revenue product of the input. 9 1 This difference between
price and value in turn is inversely related to the elasticity of supply of the
input to the firm. For instance, if the input market is nearly perfectly
competitive, the input supply elasticity will be high, and the deviation between
input price paid and the value of output will correspondingly be low.
So the index of monopsony market power would equal 1/e' where es is the
elasticity of the supply curve to (buyer) firm i. If this elasticity is infinite, that
is, if the buyer takes the input price as given, there can be no monopsony.
Monopsony requires a less than perfectly elastic (and upward-sloped) supply
curve, and that in turn requires some inputs specialized to the production of
the good in question.
We can get some important insight into monopsony by expressing e' as:
e'I = e/Si + ed
MI

J

(1

-

Sd
SI

where e', is the market supply elasticity, Si is the firm's (buyer) market share,
and e dI is the demand elasticity for the input by the fringe insurance firms
89. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 9.
90. Lerner, supra note 88.
91. Marginal revenue product equals the additional output attributable to the input times the
marginal revenue obtained from the sale of that output.
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(service purchasers). 9 2 Market power, therefore, varies inversely with the
market elasticity of supply and with the input demand elasticity of other firms,
and directly with the firm's market share.
This means that if an insurer's market share is low, it will be unlikely to
have monopsony power. But suppose an insurer's market share Si is relatively
high. What then is the possibility that e- will nevertheless take on a high value;
that is, that monopsony power will be low? One sufficient condition for this to
happen would be a very high value for e, the market elasticity of supply.
While one would not usually assume an infinite market elasticity of demand
for any product, an infinite market elasticity of supply (horizontal supply
curve) might well occur. One reason would be a situation in which the use of
inputs for the particular product is only a small part of the larger total use of
the inputs. For instance, a data processor buys computers in a large national
market; there is no chance of monopsony there. The other possibility is that
the local market can supply the service at roughly constant cost; this would
occur if there are no specialized inputs and no industry-wide advantages or
disadvantages of large scale production. Nursing home services, at least in
the long run and without certificate-of-need restrictions, might be an example
93
here.
Conversely, market supply elasticity will be less than perfectly elastic if
there is a limit on geographic transferability and there are specialized inputs
into the services's production. Medical goods (drugs, appliances) would be
geographically transferable, but most medical services would not. Services
that use specially trained labor-physician services and hospital care-would
surely qualify as services with non-infinite supply elasticities over any
reasonable length of run.
The critical question concerns the other term in the index, the demand
elasticity of the other insurers. If they are willing and able to buy all the
medical services a provider wants to sell at prices just a little above what the
dominant insurer is offering, then the latter firm would not possess market
power. The question then turns out to be a simple one: Would a hospital or
physician firm in a market in which the Blue plans have, say, a 50 percent
market share believe that half of its business could be replaced by other
insurers? If the answer is negative, then the conclusion is that the dominant
insurer has at least some market power.

92. The equation says that the firm elasticity of supply is calculated as a weighted sum of the
market elasticity of supply and the firm elasticity of demand for the other firms, with the weights
being the market share of the dominant firm.
93. If the elasticity of supply to all buyers were high, one could say that all providers have
sufficient capacity to accommodate any insurer-buyer. However, the other term, the demand
elasticity by other insurers, is also important. There must be sufficient other insurer capacity to
absorb the provider's output if the provider should lose dominant insurer business.
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VI
DEMAND SIDE WELFARE EFFECTS

Thus far this article has emphasized the impact of dominant insurer

market power on payments to suppliers and the consequent monopsony
distortions. If this power is used to force the price other insurers must charge
above cost, there also can be a reduction in the welfare of consumers who
would otherwise have purchased that insurance. For such cost shifting to
represent more than a transfer, there must be a difference, as far as some

consumers are concerned, between the coverage furnished by the dominant
insurer and that which would be supplied by other insurers; there must be

qualitative differences among various insurance products.
To emphasize such differences, imagine that the dominant insurer offers
only service benefit first dollar coverage, while at least some potential
competitors might offer HMO-type coverage with lower premiums but more
restrictions on use. Not all consumers prefer the HMO package to
conventional coverage, but some do. In addition, imagine that the dominant
insurer threatens to withdraw its business entirely from a provider if the
provider contracts with an HMO; in effect, the price imposed on the HMO
competitor is infinite. (The argument also follows if the provider is required

to charge the HMO a higher but less than infinite price.)
If there are no economies of scale in providing services, and no certificateof-need limitations, the consequent refusal of existing hospitals to deal with
an HMO would not be an impediment. The HMO would simply hire its own
providers and operate its own hospitals and would therefore still be able to
obtain services at minimum cost. It seems reasonable, however, that such a
strategy would not be feasible in most markets, given the small initial size of
an HMO, the fixed costs associated with the construction of new hospital
facilities, and the geographically limited nature of local medical care
markets .94

If the HMO cannot incur equal costs and charge low prices, or is unable to
offer coverage at all, those consumers who would have chosen the HMO will
lose welfare, since they will be deprived of the chance of buying a type of
service whose marginal opportunity cost they would have been willing to
cover. The welfare loss is limited to the difference in utility between the HMO
and the dominant insurer option, but such a difference will exist.
A similar argument applies to conventional insurers as well as to HMO's if
they are willing to offer types of coverage and types of services that the
dominant insurer is unable or unwilling to provide, but the price they must
pay for inputs is forced above minimum cost.
If the dominant insurer also extracts a discount from marginal cost for its
insureds, how does that discount affect welfare? If the discount is used by the
94. HMO's usually need to be able to deliver care soon after coverage is sold. The necessary lag
in selling coverage to a large population means that an HMO's size when it initially starts delivering
care will be small.
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dominant insurer to underprice (relative to cost) its more extensive coverage,
there will paradoxically be a reduction in welfare even as purchasers of the
insurance receive a subsidy. In effect, this privately engineered excise subsidy
to the coverage offered by the dominant insurer causes more persons at the
margin to choose that coverage even though it is worth less to them than its
cost. In this sense, both the losers and the gainers in a discounting
arrangement suffer a welfare loss; the loss for the gainers is masked by the
transfer they receive, but it occurs nonetheless.
This reasoning might be applied to Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Kansas, Inc. 9 5 If the "build your own hospital" option is ruled out, the action
of the dominant insurer in effect reduces the welfare of the consumers who
would have preferred the HMO. This would be so even if, from the dominant
insurer's perspective, it was only adopting the sound business practice of
negotiating a discount to fend off a new competitor.
VII
BRAND

LOYALTY AND THE COST-CONTAINMENT

FUNCTION

Consumers may have specific preferences toward the form of provider
relationship an insurer obtains, and toward the effect that relationship has on
both the circumstances of purchase of services and the level of benefits costs
achieved. Virtually alone among private insurers, the Blue plans have
provided service benefits, in which benefits are stated not in maximum dollar
terms but in physical units. The Blue Cross plans especially cover "semiprivate accommodations," and other physically defined units of care in
participating hospitals. Indeed, the long term special financial relationships
Blue Cross has had with hospitals is a consequence of the service benefit
definition.
While there is no evidence that this type of benefit and this type of
relationship with hospitals necessarily leads to more consumer satisfaction
than can be provided by commercial insurers with generous indemnity
benefits, it is quite possible that the fifty-year relationship between Blue Cross
and hospitals, and between Blue Shield and physicians, has produced a
differential brand perception for the Blues, relative to any other health
insurer. For some consumers, this differential perception may lead to brand
loyalty. Can brand loyalty be a source of market power?
As noted above, benefits managers would be unlikely to have preferences
for one insurer over another especially if the only insurance function were
that of paying risk. But consumers who can choose among insurers may well
attach some additional value to buying from the large market share insurer.
This observation is perhaps more important today than it was a decade ago,
because of the proliferation of multiple choice and flexible benefits options in
group health insurance plans. In these arrangements, consumers have an
95.

Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1420 (D. Kan. 1987).
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opportunity to choose from a menu of alternative insurers, HMO's, and
PPO's.

The bases for Blue Cross/Blue Shield brand loyalty are not hard to find.
The initial entrant into any business has some advantages. A large market
share, even if caused by legislatively legitimate tax advantages, will generate a
brand name recognition and a more efficient advertising strategy than is
available to other firms. The vigorous protection of the Blue Cross trademark
and the recent argument by Blue Cross plans for limitation on the use of this
96
trademark both imply that the plans recognize this advantage.
Speculation that advertising can confer market power, that there are first
entry advantages, and that these features are reinforced by other special
advantages to a seller are all fairly well-known economic propositions. Less
clear, however, is whether this speculation, even if it is true, furnishes a basis
for any legal action. Investment in advertising and good will is, at any point in
time, open to any firm. If one firm has the foresight or the good fortune to
enter first, and thereby finds that its advertising cost-effectiveness is higher
than for subsequent entrants, the case for limitation of this advantage would
be weak, and there might eventually be deterrent effects on innovation.
There is, however, another possible argument. If one accepts the view
that, in their early years, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans engaged in anticompetitive behavior, behavior which (among other things) made their market
share higher than it would otherwise be, then one might be willing to accept
that perhaps not all of their current good will is deserved.
The main problem with advancing this view is that of establishing the case
that early market power did indeed exist. The case that dealt most directly
with that question, United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 9 7 did result in

acquittal of Blue Shield. Many commentators have, however, argued for the
use of other interpretation of the evidence in that case. 98 But in principle, a
market share built on anticompetitive behavior, even if that behavior has by
now ceased, should not be permitted to generate additional market power.
VIII
CONCLUSION

A.

Remedies for Insurer Market Power

The large market shares reported earlier, and the relationship between
market share, discounts, and tax and regulatory advantages for the Blue plans,
all strongly suggest that the health insurance market does not work like a
competitive market. There is presently no complete evidence on supply and
96. Central Benefits Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, No. C-2-88-508, slip op.
(D.C. Ohio Mar. 22 1989).
97. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
98. Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 53; C. HAVIGHURST, TESTIMONY IN U.S. CONGRESS,
SENATE SUBCOMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND
THE HEALTH SERVICES MARKET,

MONOPOLY OF THE JUDICIARY, HEARINGS:

93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1024 (1974).
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demand elasticities discussed above, so one cannot be fully conclusive here,
but the evidence is powerfully suggestive.
The difference from a competitive equilibrium, I hasten to add, is not likely
to be apparent in the degree of perceived rivalry at the margin between the
Blues and other insurers. The Blues will correctly perceive that they are in a
daily struggle for market share and for profitable business, given the discount
they have negotiated and the mix of policies they have chosen to offer. Shifts
in consumer tastes for types of policies and the availability of other
alternatives will mean (and has meant) that the Blues will lose business and
will have to work hard to maintain what they have. But the evidence does
seem to indicate that there is a core of advantage made available to the Blue
plans in many (although not all) geographic areas, and that this advantage
results in market equilibrium different from what it would have been had the
Blues never been given those advantages.
As usual, both public policy and the law are charged with making educated
guesses about what steps might improve welfare. There is no evidence that
demonstrates that the Blues are more efficient in producing insurance (the
financing function) than are their commercial rivals. And the territorial
restrictions that the Blues impose on themselves prevent those plans that
could achieve economies of scale from doing so. (The presence of viable
small firms in the commercial markets suggests that the existence of
economies of scale in health insurance is not a foregone conclusion.)
The well-advertised activity of the Blues in forcing cost control on
providers is, as noted above, what we would expect, given their generous
benefit plans. It is also subject to monopsonistic abuse and, in any event, its
effectiveness has never been convincingly documented.
Removal of the tax subsidies would be a potential remedy for possible
market power, and Congress has already taken a small step in that direction
with regard to federal taxation. 99 The argument made above implies,
however, that removing the subsidy alone and leaving the large market share
it caused in place will not be sufficient to prevent the exercise of market
power. Attempts to enhance a plan's discount-enforcing power (as in bans on
balance-billing) or to exercise that power (as in a Blue-sponsored PPO)
should still be viewed with caution.
B.

From Theory Back to Reality

The source of insurer market power that this article has emphasized is a
market-share-based discount, and it has been argued that this source can
generate market power regardless of whether the dominant insurer is
controlled by providers or by its management (or its customers). For the
numerous examples of hospital discounts, and for the less frequent examples
of balance-billing-bans for physician services, this argument applies. Brand
loyalty provides another explanation for market power, but one less obviously
99.
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a candidate for legal limitation. But there are some Blue Cross plans that
never required discounts, and many Blue Shield plans historically have not
done so. Are these non-discounting plans only subject to the weaker brand
loyalty criticism?
To an extent, the answer is that some Blue plans are free of all antitrustrelated criticism. In general, those Blue Cross plans with no discounts have
low market shares, and therefore are not a matter of concern. 0 0 However,
there are instructive exceptions. Until recently, for example, Indiana Blue
Cross received no discount and had a market share of about one-third.' 0 ' But
Indiana Blue Cross did operate a quasi-public hospital rate-setting program,
one which effectively defused many competitive strategies that might
otherwise have been available to other insurers, by in effect operating a pricefixing mechanism. So in some few cases, large market share Blue Cross plans
have selected substitutes for discounts.
That still leaves the non-discounting Blue Shield plans. It is only fair to
admit that we are still continuing the search begun in Oregon State Medical
Society 102 for the smoking gun. Perhaps some source of market power (in
excess of state-awarded advantages) can be found, but as of yet none has been
discovered. However, should such plans turn to discrimination (in the form
of balance-billing bans, maximum-price agreements, or straightforward
discounting-bidding requirements), then the arguments given above would
apply.
C.

Concluding Summary

The possibilities for competition among health insurers and the need for
antitrust scrutiny depend upon which function health insurers are performing.
If they are limited to being arm's-length poolers of risk and financers of
medical bills, there is little reason to anticipate the development of market
power; the market will be competitive. Especially favorable tax or regulatory
treatment may produce large market shares for the "Blue" insurers, and the
large share insurers probably will use the cost advantages they have been
given, but market power cannot be pushed beyond this legislatively bestowed
(and approved) level. For large group purchasers, the ease of entry and
expansion by existing firms, and the self-insurance option, are probably
sufficient to ensure that price will not rise above the level needed to cover
administrative costs.
There are, however, two alternative sources of market power that may be
subjects of concern. For individual and small group insurance purchasers,
advertising and brand name effects may lead to an ability to raise price above
marginal cost. However, the antitrust interpretation of this source of market
power is unclear. The second source is the potential ability of an insurer
100. See Table 2, supra p. 243.
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which is a large market share purchaser of medical care inputs to exercise
monopsony power in the inputs markets. Such monopsony can lead to greater
market power in the sale of health insurance, but it also has important anticompetitive distortions of its own in markets for medical services. The cost of
these distortions falls primarily on suppliers of inputs-but doctors and
nurses are people whose welfare ought to count. The Lerner index shows
that a large market share can lead to monopsony if there are specialized
inputs in production (or substantial earmarked capital investments) and other
insurers are not expected by buyers to be able to replace dominant insurer
03
business whose withdrawal is threatened.
Not only does monopsony permit politically legitimate advantages to be
extended to more market power than was intended; it also permits market
power to survive even after the bases for a large initial market share-whether
tax subsidy, first entry, special relationships with providers, or brand loyaltycease to exist.
Monopsony is uncommon as a source of permanent market power because
there are few services (and even fewer goods) that combine a large buyer
market share and inputs highly specialized in the production of a particular
output. Physical capital, once investment is actually made, can be productspecific, but its useful life is often relatively short. Perhaps it is the
importance of human capital-professional training-which is less malleable,
less adaptable, and less moveable, that raises a greater danger of monopsony
in medical markets. The possibility of an insurers-consumer cartel against
providers, even one with serious inefficiency consequences, also makes
analysis more difficult and policy remedies less attractive on the surface. The
efficiency consequences of this market power are long term, but no less
important for that reason.
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